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Using micro data on more than 130,000 individuals from 69 countries, we analyze the extent to which
joblessness of the individuals and the prevailing unemployment rate in the country impact perceptions
of the effectiveness of democracy.   We find that personal joblessness experience translates into negative
opinions about the effectiveness of democracy and it increases the desire for a rogue leader.  Evidence
from people who live in European countries suggests that being jobless for more than a year is the
source of  discontent.  We also find that well-educated and wealthier individuals are less likely to indicate
that democracies are ineffective, regardless of  joblessness. People’s beliefs about the effectiveness
of democracy as system of governance are also shaped by the unemployment rate in countries with
low levels of democracy.  The results suggest that periods of high unemployment and joblessness could
hinder the development of democracy or threaten its existence.
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  Economists are increasingly interested in the impact of institutions on economic 
development.  Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2000) argue that high quality institutions in a country, represented by a number 
of dimensions such as the protection of property rights and a functioning democracy, foster 
economic development because they promote investment in human capital and physical 
capital.  Countries that are governed by high quality institutions experience higher capital 
accumulation, productivity, and output per worker (Hall and Jones 1999).  Rodrik (1999) 
shows that the extent of democracy in a country has a positive impact on wages received by 
manufacturing workers.  Barro (1996) argues that a more democratic regime stimulates 
economic growth when the level of political freedom is low.
1  
  The potential impact of economic development on the extent of democracy is an 
equally important research question, and whether an increase in income of a country causes 
its democracy to improve has been a subject of recent debate.  As widely quoted in this 
literature, a common perspective, articulated by Lipset (1959) is that “From Aristotle down 
to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few 
citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population 
could intelligently participate in politics an could develop the self-restraint necessary to 
avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues.”   Barro (1999) finds that the 
                                                            
1 In the same paper Barro identifies a nonlinear impact of democracy; i.e. democracy hinders growth when a 
moderate level of democracy has already been attained.  He argues that this could because democracy may 
encourage redistribution of income from the rich to the poor and may enhance the power of interest groups.    
It has also been suggested that institutions have no direct impact on economic growth.  Rather, human capital 
is the main driver of economic growth and good economic policies, sometimes implemented by dictators, can 




propensity for democracy rises with per capita GDP.  Minier (2001) shows that an increase 
in per capita GDP is associated with an enhanced demand for democracy, approximated by 
pro-democracy public demonstrations.  Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) report that 
economic development is a key factor determining the intensity of democratic reforms in a 
country.   On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2008) find no significant impact of GDP 
growth on democratization. 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature on the determinants of democracy.  
However, it differs from the previous work in an important way.   It employs individual-
level, rather than country-level data.  The paper investigates the extent to which an 
individual’s own joblessness and the unemployment rate of his/her country make him/her 
more likely to reveal a distaste towards the effectiveness of democracy.   Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001) argue that regime changes are more likely during recessionary periods; and 
Haggard and Kaufman (1995) point out that many Latin American transitions to democracy 
coincided with economic crises.   The implication is that short-term economic downturns 
may prompt reactions towards the existing regime.   While it is sensible to think that 
undesirable economic conditions would trigger enhanced opposition movements against 
existing undemocratic regimes, it is equally reasonable to argue that tough economic 
conditions in a democratic regime could prompt negative feelings towards democracy.  For 
example, Gasiorowski (1995) and Prezworski et al. (1996) demonstrate that recessions 
significantly increase the probability of a coup.  Because of the free-rider problem, a change 
in perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy among the residents of a country does 
not necessarily imply involvement in direct actions against democracy, such as participation 
in a revolt (MacCulloch 2005).  Nevertheless, it is important to understand how perceptions 4 
 
about democracy are impacted by personal economic conditions as these perceptions may 
translate into political actions against democracy in subtle ways such as voting for a political 
party which has an explicit or implicit anti-democratic platform.    
We use micro data on 131,615 individuals from 69 countries to investigate the extent 
to which personal joblessness of individuals and the unemployment rate in their country 
impact their perceptions of operational efficiency of democracy.   We find that 
observationally identical individuals have weaker beliefs about democratic efficiency if they 
are jobless and if duration of joblessness is longer than one year.  The same is true if the 
unemployment rate of the country goes up and if these individuals live in countries with low 
levels of democracy.  These results underline the importance of labor market policies in 
developing countries with struggling democracies.  We also find that higher household 
income and personal education promote stronger perceptions about the effectiveness of 
democracy.  Section II describes the empirical specification and the data. Section III 
presents the results and Section IV is the conclusion. 
 
II. Empirical Specification  
The basic model can be specified as follows: 
 
(1)   D ict*=αict+β Joblessict+γURct+XictΩ
’+YctΨ
’+ τt + εict , 
  
 where  Dict* measures individual i’s propensity for unhappiness with democratic 
efficiency who lives in country c, who was surveyed in year t. Although an individual’s 
propensity for negative feelings towards democracy is unobservable, an indicator variable 




’+ τt +  εict>0).  If the error term εict  in 
Equation  (1) is normally distributed, then the result is a standard single-equation probit 
specification.  
    We employ three different variables to represent Dict  to capture the beliefs about the 
effectiveness of democracy.  The first measure is an indicator of the extent to which the 
individual believes that the economic system runs badly in democracies.   The second one 
gauges general effectiveness of democracy as a political decision-making system.  It 
measures whether the individual believes that democracies are indecisive and have too much 
quibbling.  The third one measures the preference of the individual towards a leader who 
does not bother with key aspects of a democracy such as the parliament and elections.  The 
details of these variables are described in the data section below.   
  The specification depicted by Equation (1) is similar in spirit to a line of research 
conducted by political scientists and economists to explain the voting patterns and to 
forecast election results.  For example, Kramer (1971), Stigler (1973), Fair (1978) analyzed 
the impact of economic conditions on the percentage of votes received by incumbent and 
opposition parties in the U.S. Presidential or Congressional elections.  Markus (1988) and 
Nannestad and Paldam (1997) analyzed the propensity to vote for the incumbent as a 
function of personal economic circumstances and aggregate macroeconomic conditions in 
the U.S. and in Denmark, respectively.  Garand and Ulrich (2009) investigate the impact of 
macroeconomic conditions on individuals’ subjective evaluations of the state of the 
economy, and the resultant voting behavior.  
  The key explanatory variable Joblessict is a dichotomous indicator that identifies if 
person i who lives in country c and surveyed in year t is unemployed.  We also investigate 6 
 
the extent to which the aggregate unemployment rate in the country (UR) has an impact on 
people’s attitudes towards the efficiency of democracy.  The impact of the unemployment 
rate, holding constant one’s own employment status, may work through at least two 
different channels.  First, regardless of whether a person is employed or unemployed, an 
increase in the unemployment rate of the country may impact the individual’s expected 
future utility. Specifically, an increase in overall joblessness in the economy may decrease 
the individual’s subjective probability of future employment and therefore it would reduce 
his/her expected future utility.  This could in turn influence his/her propensity for 
satisfaction with democracy as a system of governance.  Second, an increase in the 
unemployment rate may have a direct impact on individuals’ level of happiness if the utility 
function contains other-regarding preferences.  For example, it has been shown that 
individual happiness declines as the unemployment rate goes up, conditional on personal 
employment. (Clark and Oswald 1994, Clark 2003, Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998).  
Therefore, an increase in the unemployment rate may alter attitudes towards democracy 
through its direct impact on utility. 
  Differences across individuals with respect to their general attitudes towards 
democracy are represented by αict  in Equation (1), where larger values indicate higher 
baseline propensity for dissatisfaction with democracy.  Note that α has a subscript c 
indicating that the extent of unhappiness with democracy may vary between countries.  This 
could be because of cultural, historical and institutional differences between countries.  Also 
note that α has subscript i, indicating that predisposition to dissatisfaction with democracy 
may vary between people who live in the same country.  This could be because of 
differences in family background and personal characteristics.   7 
 
   It is possible that individuals who have negative attitudes towards democracy (those 
with large values of α)  face difficulties in finding and retaining jobs.
2  If α is positively 
correlated with the propensity for joblessness, the failure to  account for it would bias β 
upwards.  To guard against this possibility, the model includes the vector X, containing 
personal attributes of the individual, such as age, gender, type of employment if the person 
is not jobless (such as having a part-time job, having a full time job, being a student, being a 
housewife and so on), marital status, the number of children, the level of education and 
income of the individual.   However, inclusion of personal characteristics may not fully 
control for the unobserved impact of the individual’s general attitude towards democracy.  
Therefore, we add a control variable to the model that gauges the person’s general attitude 
towards democracy as a measure of  α.  This variable is created by the reactions to the 
question “Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of 
government.”  Possible answers to this question are strongly agree, agree, disagree and 
strongly disagree.   The variable Democracy is Not Better takes the value of one if the 
respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement about the merit of democracy. 
We discuss potential empirical issues, and threats to identification in the results section.  
Specifically, we address potential reverse causality and a potential for a spurious 
relationship between joblessness and perceptions about democratic efficiency. 
  In Equation (1) Y stands for a vector of country attributes such as the proportions of 
Muslims, Catholics and Protestants in the country, an indicator variable to specify if the 
country was ever colonized, and the Human Development Index of the United Nations 
                                                            
2  This is because the empirical analyses are conducted in a sample of countries, the majority of 
which is democratic, although the extent of democracy differs between the countries. Examples 
of undemocratic countries are Morocco, which is governed by a constitutional monarchy and 
Saudi Arabia, which is an Islamic monarchy. 8 
 
Development Program (UNDP).  This index includes such elements as life expectancy at 
birth, the adult literacy rate and GDP per capita. Other country variables include the 
magnitude of international trade (the share of exports plus imports in total GDP) as a 
measure of openness, military expenditures as a proportion of GDP, and the inflation rate in 
the country during the survey year.   
III. Data 
  The primary data are obtained from the two waves of the World Values Survey 
(WVS).  The WVS includes information on individual’s beliefs, values and attitudes 
towards various issues ranging from politics to environmental protection to religion.  The 
data set also includes information on personal characteristics of the respondents.  Interviews 
have been carried out with nationally representative samples (at least 1,000 individuals from 
each country) of 69 countries (which make up about 85 percent of the world's population) 
on all six inhabited continents in five waves between 1981 and 2007.  We merged the WVS 
data with various country attributes to obtain our final sample of 131,615 individuals from 
69 countries.
3 
 Descriptive  statistics  are  provided in Table 1.  The three dependent variables are 
Democracy is Bad for the Economy, Democracies are Indecisive and Rogue Leader. 
Democracy is Bad for the Economy takes the value of 1 if the respondent agrees or strongly 
agrees with the statement that “In democracies, the economic system runs badly,” and zero 
if the respondent disagrees or strongly disagrees.  Democracies are Indecisive takes the 
value of 1 if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that “Democracies 
                                                            
3  Data from 69 countries in the 3
rd and the 4
th waves covering years 1994 to 2004 are analyzed in 
this paper since the dependent variables are based on the questions that are asked only in these 
waves. 9 
 
are indecisive and have too much quibbling,” and zero if he/she disagrees or strongly 
disagrees.  Rogue Leader takes the value of 1 if the respondent indicated that  “Having a 
strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” is very good or 
fairly good; and zero if the respondent replied that such a leader is bad or very bad. 
  Low Income is a dichotomous indicator that takes the value of 1 if the person’s 
household   income belongs to the bottom third of the income distribution of his/her country.  
Medium Income is equal to 1 if the household income is in the middle-third of the income 
distribution of the country and zero otherwise.  High Income identifies whether the personal 
household income belongs to the top third of the country’s income distribution. 
 Low  Education  is a dummy variable which indicates that the person has completed at 
most elementary education, but has not completed a technical or vocational training.  If the 
person has completed secondary school, which includes technical or vocational training or 
university-preparatory type education, Middle Education takes the value of 1, and it is zero 
otherwise.   The indicator variable High Education is equal to 1 if the individual has a 
university degree, has attended university, or has received a tertiary certificate. 
  Family characteristics of the individuals are captured by dummies for marital status 
and the number of children. Specifically, we categorized individuals into three groups 
according to their marital status: Single, Married, and Divorced/Widowed, where 
Divorced/Widowed includes those who are separated.  Similarly, five mutually exclusive 
dummy variables identify the number of children of the person:  No Children, 1 Child, 2 
Children, 3 Children and 4+ Children.  Personal employment indicators classify the 
respondent into various categories.  If the person holds more than one job, he/she is 
classified based on the characteristics of the main job.  The categories include being jobless 10 
 
(unemployed), working full-time, working part-time, being self-employed, having been 
retired, being a student, being housewife, or other employment. 
  Country-level variables include an indicator variable to represent if the country was 
ever colonized.  Past colonization experience of the country may have an impact on the 
attitudes toward democracy. 
4  Also included in the group of country attributes is the 
religious make-up of the country, measured by proportion of the population that is Muslim, 
proportion Catholic, proportion Protestant and the proportion that adheres to other religions.  
Religion is a major part of culture, and in countries with hierarchical religions such as 
Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, it may be culturally more difficult to challenge 
the authority of office-holders in comparison to cultures with more individualistic or 
egalitarian religions such as Protestantism.  Second, as argued by Treisman (2000), in 
religions such as Protestantism, which emerged as a reaction to a state-sponsored religion, 
there may be stronger emphasis on monitoring potential abuses of state officials. By 
contrast, in more traditional religions such as Islam or Catholicism, such a check-and-
balance role may be absent.   
   Regressions also include the Human Development Index created by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). The Human Development Index (HDI) is a 
composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy 
at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross 
enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and the standard of living, as 
measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity US dollars. 
                                                            
4 Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) show that the colonial origins of a country influence its economic 
development. 11 
 
  We control for the share of military expenditures in GDP to account for the 
differences in the government policies between more democratic and less democratic 
regimes. Specifically, if governments in countries with low levels of democracy require 
more suppressive mechanism to be able to keep competitors out of office, and such 
governments may spend a larger fraction of GDP on military. Further, leaders of such 
authoritarian regimes have greater incentives to avoid conflict with the military to keep the 
military as a political ally, in comparison to the leaders of democratic regimes. This is 
because, authoritarian leaders may want the support of military in case of a revolt or they 
may want to use the military as domestic police in the country (Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i- 
Martin 2004). 
  The unemployment rate of the country is obtained mainly from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank.  The other source of the unemployment rate is 
the International Labour Organization’s KILM database.  If the unemployment rate is not 
available for one country at a specific year through WDI, it is imputed by assigning either 
the most recent year’s unemployment or the average of the closest years’ unemployment 
rates for that country in WDI.  If neither of the imputation methods work (such as in the 
cases when there was no recent years’ unemployment rates for a country or no data was 
available in WDI), then the unemployment rate from KILM database is employed.  
  For each country we also have data on the level of democracy. This variable, 
obtained from Polity IV
5, measures various aspects of democracy in the country including 
competitiveness of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, 




-10 to 10, where a higher value represents a better-functioning democracy. 
6  The means and 
standard deviations of country characteristics are calculated by considering each country-
year as one observation. 
 
III. Results 
  Table 2 displays the marginal effect obtained from estimation of Equation (1) using 
probit.  Standard errors, that are corrected for arbitrary covariance structure and that are 
adjusted for clustering within a country in a specific year, are reported in parentheses.  
Regressions also include time dummies to control for the fact that different countries are 
surveyed in different years, and continent fixed effects to control for  unobservable 
characteristics that may be common to the countries in the same broad geographic area.   
  Column (1) reports the results of the model where the dependent variable is whether 
the respondent believes that democracy is bad for the economy. The second column displays 
the results of the models where the dependent variable is whether the respondent believes 
that democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling.  The third column pertains 
to the model where the dependent variable indicates if the respondent believes that a strong 
leader who does not bother with the parliament and elections is good for the country.  
  Column (1) of Table 2 demonstrates that being jobless is associated with about a 5 
percentage point increase in the propensity to declare that democracy is bad for the 
                                                            
6 The data on democracy variable were not available for some countries for some years from the 
source. The democracy variable is completed by assigning the closest year’s democracy index value 
in that country or that of the previous governing country. For example, the democracy scores of 
Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia in 1991 are assigned to Belarus, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Czech Republic in 1990, respectively (and in 1991 for Czech Republic). 
Similarly, democracy index values for Russian Federation in 1992 and Slovakia in 1992 are assigned 
to the same countries in 1990 and 1991. 13 
 
economy.  Similarly, columns 2 and 3 show that if the individual is jobless, his/her 
propensity to indicate that democracies are indecisive or that a rogue leader can better 
manage the country goes up by 3 to 5 percentage points.  Holding constant personal 
employment, a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate of the country 
increases the propensity to declare that democracy is bad for the economy by 0.4 percentage 
points and that a rogue leader is desirable by 0.6 percentage points.  That is, the extent of 
joblessness in the economy has an additional impact on the negative attitudes towards 
democracy.  As expected, those who agree with the statement that democracy is not better 
than any other form of government (Democracy is Not Better=1) tend to indicate that 
democracies are bad for the economy, that democracies are indecisive, and that a rouge 
leader can better manage the country. 
  Individuals who live in households where household income is in the middle of the 
income distribution of the country are 2 percentage points less likely to reveal negative 
feelings towards the efficiency of democracy in comparison to individuals who live in 
households where the household income belongs to the bottom one-third of the income 
distribution (the left-out category).  Individuals who belong to the richest one-third of the 
households of a country (High Income=1) are 3 to 5 percentage points less likely to reveal 
negative feelings toward the efficiency of democracy or for the desire to have a rouge 
leader.  Education of the individual has a significantly negative impact on the propensity to 
have negative feelings toward democracy.  Specifically, those who attended college or who 
have college degrees are about 12 percentage points less likely to indicate that democracies 
are bad for the economy in comparison to those who have an elementary school education 
or less.  Those who have a secondary degree (Middle Education=1) are 5 percentage points 14 
 
less likely to give positive responses to the same question in comparison to those who are 
not educated. The same is true regarding preferences about other questions as revealed by 
columns 2 and 3.  Thus, regardless of their joblessness situation, individuals’ beliefs about 
the efficiency of democracy goes down the poorer they are and the less educated they are.  
  All else the same, retired people display stronger negative feelings towards 
democracy.  While the unemployment rate of the country has an impact as discussed above, 
other economic indicators of the country, such as the extent of openness to international 
trade and the inflation rate, do not impact individuals’ beliefs about democratic efficiency.  
The same is true for the Human Development Index.  The impacts of ever having been 
colonized and that of military spending are positive in column (1), although the coefficient 
is not significantly different from zero in models displayed in columns 2 and 3.  As will be 
discussed below, the impact of colonization on people’s preferences for democracy will 
change direction if the models are estimated by the level of democracy of the country.  As 
the proportion of people who are Protestant in the country goes up, the propensity for 
disapproval of the effectiveness of democracy goes down.   
Political Misfits and Reverse Causality 
  Consistent with our expectations, β in Equation (1) is estimated to be positive, 
indicating that jobless individuals have less favorable perceptions of the effectiveness of 
democracy in comparison to the perceptions of those who have jobs.  The model controls for 
individuals’ general attitudes toward democracy, measured by the variable Democracy is 
Not Better.  However, it is still possible that the results are driven by those individuals 
whose views about democracy are not in line with the majority view of the population and 
that they are jobless because of this political conflict.  That is, causality may run from the 15 
 
opinions about the effectiveness of democracy to joblessness.  A person who is a “political 
misfit” in a society may find it difficult to find a job.  To control for this effect, we classify 
countries into two categories.  The first group consists of countries with a high level of 
functioning democracy and the second group contains countries where the level of 
democracy is lower.  Specifically, we divide countries into two groups depending on 
whether the democracy index is less than seven, or greater than or equal to seven.
7  We 
create a dichotomous indicator, Dislikes Democracy in a Democratic Country,  which takes 
the value of 1 if the person thinks that democracy is not the best form of government 
(Democracy is Not Better=1) but who lives in a country with high-level of democracy.  
Similarly, the indicator variable Likes Democracy in a Less Democratic Country takes the 
value of 1 if the person lives in a country with low level of democracy, but thinks that 
democracy is the best form of government (Democracy is Not Better=0).  The results 
obtained from the specification that includes these additional control variables are reported 
in Panel A of Table 3.  In the interest if space only the coefficients and the corresponding 
                                                            
7 The first groups ( Democracy<7) consists of Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Armenia, Belarus, 
China, Croatia, Estonia, Iran, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Russian Federation, Singapore, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania.  The second group 
(Democracy>=7) includes Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Republic of Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Great Britain, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela.  The 
countries Albania, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Pakistan and Peru appear in both high democracy 
and low democracy samples. This is because the two waves of interviews were conducted in these 
countries in different years and the level of democracy has changed between the two survey years.  
For example, the democracy index was 5 in Albania in 1998 and it rose to 7 in 2002; it was 6 in 
1996 in the Republic of Korea and rose to 8 in 2001.  The index took a value of  4 in 1996 for 
Mexico, but it rose to 8 in 2000 in that country.  Democracy index was 7 in Pakistan in 1997 and it 




standard errors of Joblessness the Unemployment Rate and the variables to indicate whether 
the person is a political misfit in his/her country are reported.  This specification did not 
alter either the point estimates or their estimated standard errors. The panel B of Table 3 
displays the results of the same specification with one difference.  These results are obtained 
from the model which omits the country variables, but includes country fixed-effects 
instead.  In this specification the coefficients of Jobless remain the same, but the impact of 
the country unemployment loses statistical significance and/or changes sign.  We also 
estimated the models by excluding political misfits from the sample.  That is, we analyzed 
the relationship between joblessness, unemployment rate and preferences for democracy in 
sample of individuals whose general feelings towards democracy are aligned with the 
society they live in.  The results remained the same.  
It is plausible that the impact of joblessness on the beliefs about the effectiveness of 
democracy is different in countries with low levels of democracy in comparison to countries 
with a high level of democracy. Therefore, we estimated the model separately for countries 
with low levels of democracy (Democracy<7) and for countries that have a high level of 
democracy (Democracy  ≥7).  The results are presented in Tables 4A and 4B.  The 
specifications also include the indicator variable to identify if the respondent is a political 
misfit in his/her country.
8 
There are commonalities in the results that are obtained from countries with low and 
high-levels of democracy.  For example, in both groups of countries joblessness of an 
individual has a negative influence on the feelings towards democratic efficiency.  The 
impact is similar between the two group of countries.  Although the marginal effect of 
                                                            
8  The results did not change appreciably when we classified the countries based on the democracy 
cutoffs at 6 or 8). 17 
 
joblessness is slightly larger in countries with high levels of democracy, so are the baselines 
in these countries.
9  Being divorced, separated from the spouse or being a widow is also 
correlated with having negative feelings toward democracy; and the same is true of being 
retired.   
  There are also interesting contrasts between the results obtained from the two groups 
of countries.  The unemployment rate has a strong impact on the feelings toward democracy 
for people in countries where the level of democracy is low (Table 4A), while the 
unemployment rate has no impact on people’s feelings towards the effectiveness of 
democracy in countries where the level of democracy is high (Table 4B).  The former group 
consists of mostly, but not exclusively, of developing countries (see footnote 7), where the 
societies are collectivist, rather than individualistic (Mocan 2008).  Thus, an increase in the 
unemployment rate may have a direct impact on the utility of the individual based on other-
regarding preferences.  It could also be the case that an increase in the unemployment rate 
triggers a higher level of anxiety in these countries because an increase in the 
unemployment rate may be associated with a larger degree of uncertainty about the future of 
the labor market in these countries. 
 In the group of countries where democracy is higher, having ever been a colony has 
no impact on the extent of people’s feelings towards democracy.  On the other hand, among 
the group of countries with low levels of democracy, having been colonized in the past 
decreases the propensity to indicate that democracies are bad for the economy.  In countries 
                                                            
9  In  countries with low levels of democracy, the proportion of people who indicated that 
democracy  is bad for the economy is 0.33, while it is 0.35 in the countries with high levels of 
democracy.  The proportion of people who indicated that democracies are indecisive is 0.47 in the 
former group and it is 0.54 in the latter. Finally the proportion who prefers  a rogue leader is  0.33 in 
the former group and 0.37 in the latter. 
 18 
 
with low levels of democracy, the propensity to respond in the affirmative that democracies 
are bad for the economy, democracies are indecisive, and a rouge leader is good for the 
country is lower if the individual’s household income belongs to the top one-third of the 
country’s income distribution and if the individual has attended  or completed college.  In 
comparison, in the sample of people who live in countries with high levels of democracy, a 
switch in household income from the lowest third of the distribution to the middle income 
group is associated with a reduction in negative feelings towards the effectiveness of 
democracy.  The same is effect is achieved with an increase in personal education from the 
lowest echelon (elementary education or less) to the secondary education level. This means 
that in countries with low levels of democracy, a change in feelings towards the 
effectiveness of democracy can only be achieved with a more substantial increase in 
personal education and household income in comparison to countries where high levels of 
democracy. 
Potential for a Spurious Relationship 
  The specifications we estimated include a large number of country-level variables as 
well as a large number of personal attributes, including the individuals’ general feelings 
towards democracy.  To analyze the significance of a potential reverse causality, we also ran 
specifications that included a variable that gauges the extent of the mismatch between the 
individual’s general feelings towards democracy and the level of democracy of the country 
as described above.  In all specifications the impact of joblessness on the perceptions of the 
effectiveness of democracy remained robust.  Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that preferences for the effectiveness of democracy are indications of a general 
feeling towards the government or towards public policy.  If that is the case, what we 19 
 
identify as the impact of joblessness on attitudes towards the effectiveness of democracy 
could be nothing but the relationship between joblessness and general unhappiness about the 
government or governance of the country.    To investigate if this is the case, we estimate 
the same models by using three different dependent variables.  These dependent variables 
aim to gauge the extent of confidence people reveal in the government and the level of 
satisfaction with the manner in which country’s affairs are handled.   The first variable is 
based on the question “Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the 
government?”  Potential answers are:  a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, 
not very much confidence or none at all.  A dummy variable is created that takes the value 
of one if the individual indicated he/she did not have very much confidence or had no 
confidence in the government.  The second question aims to measure the extent of 
dissatisfaction with the government, where people were asked: “How satisfied are you with 
the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say 
you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?”  We classified 
individuals as dissatisfied with the people in the national office if they indicated that they 
were fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.   The third variable is based on the question: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking 
out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?”  A dichotomous 
variable, which takes the value of 1 is created if the respondent indicated that the country 
was run by a few big interests.   
  We ran probit models using these three indicators as dependent variables.  We 
employed the same specifications as in Tables 2 and 3, using the same samples.  That is, we 
included individuals that were part of the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 and who also 20 
 
answered the three questions above. 
10  The results are displayed in Table 5.  We ran two 
specifications for each question.  Panel A displays the results which are based on the 
specification presented in Table 2, and Panel B displays the results which include the 
variable which measures if the person is political misfit in his/her country.  The coefficient 
of Joblessness is not different from zero in any specification in Table 5. This indicates that 
the impact of being jobless on the beliefs about the effectiveness of democracy, displayed in 
Tables 2-4, is not likely to be an artifact of a general displeasure towards government, but 
rather, it is targeted towards democracy. 
 
Duration of Joblessness 
  It is possible that the impact of joblessness on the perceptions about the effectiveness 
of democracy changes by the duration of joblessness. That is, individuals’ attitudes may 
depend on how long they have been without a job.  To investigate if this is the case, we 
replace the variable Jobless with three mutually exclusive dummy variables: Jobless-Less 
than 6 months, Jobless 6 months to 1  year, and Jobless: More than 1 year. These variables 
identify whether the person was unemployed for less than six months, six months to a year, 
or  more than one year, respectively.  The information about the duration of joblessness was 
based on the following question: “For how long are you unemployed?” The responded could 
choose among six categories ranging from “less than half a year” to “more than two years”.    
This question was asked in 1999 in the overwhelming majority of cases, and it was asked 
only in European countries.  Therefore, the sample used in this analysis is smaller and is not 
                                                            
10 Using all individuals who answered these two questions regardless of whether they answered the 
questions about democratic efficiency (which generated a 10% increase in sample size) did not alter 
the results.  
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comparable to the sample used in previous analyses.
11  Nevertheless the results, displayed in 
Table 6 are informative, and they indicate that in the sample of Europeans, the duration of 
joblessness matters.  More specifically, the perceptions about the effectiveness of 
democracy and the desire for a rouge leader impact of joblessness is driven by long-term 
unemployment.   Short-term unemployment (less than six months) may be voluntary or 
frictional, which would not prompt negative feelings towards democracy. Table 6 shows 
that those who are unemployed for less than six months do not have systematically different 
perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy in comparison to those who have jobs. 
The same is true for those who are unemployed for a period of six months to a year. 
However, those who are unemployed for more than one year are significantly more likely to 
indicate that democracy is bad for the economy, that democracies are indecisive and involve 
too much quibbling, and that a rouge leader is preferable.    Thus, the results obtained from 
the European sample indicate that long-term joblessness alters people’s perceptions of 
democracy. 
 
IV. Summary and conclusions 
  This paper employs micro data on more than 130,000 people from 69 countries to 
investigate the relationship between personal joblessness of the individuals and their 
perceptions of the effectiveness of democracy.  We control for a large set of personal 
characteristics, country attributes, as well as individuals’ general feelings towards 
democracy.  In non-experimental data sets, such as the one used in this paper, one can never 
                                                            
11  The sample covers the following countries: Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, and 
Turkey. 22 
 
be certain about the true cause-and-effect relationship between the variables. For example, 
reverse causality is possible; i.e., an individual’s perceptions about the effectiveness of 
democracy may impact his/her employability.  This could especially be the case if the 
person is a political misfit in his/her country.  For example, a person may believe that 
democracy is not a desirable form of government.  This person would be a political misfit if 
he/she lives in country that has a high level of democracy, and being a political misfit may 
prevent the person from finding or holding a job.  To avoid a potential bias that may emerge 
through this channel, we adjust for the alignment of the person’s general feelings towards 
democracy with the extent of the democracy in the country. 
  We find that observationally identical individuals who live in the same country have 
different perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy if they differ in their joblessness 
experience.  Specifically, being jobless increases people’s propensity to declare that 
economic system runs badly in democracies, that democracies are indecisive and involve 
too much quibbling, and that a leader who does not bother with the parliament and elections 
is preferable.   This impact of joblessness exists  both in countries with low levels of 
democracy and in countries with high levels of democracy.   Information available in a 
subsample of data (people who live in European countries) indicates that the source of 
discontent with democracy is joblessness that lasts longer than one year.  An increase in the 
unemployment rate of the country evokes negative feelings about the performance of 
democracy for individuals who live in countries with low levels of democracy.  We also find 
that well-educated and wealthier individuals are less likely to indicate that democracies are 
ineffective, regardless of  joblessness.   23 
 
  When we employ alternative dependent variables such as whether the person has 
confidence in the government, whether the person is satisfied with the way people in the 
national office are handling the country’s affairs, and whether the person believes that the 
country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, we find that joblessness has 
no impact on these opinions.   This suggests that the impact of joblessness on negative 
perceptions about the effectiveness of democracy is not a reflection of a general disapproval 
of the government.  
  Given the research that indicates a strong impact of democratization and institutional 
quality on economic development, it is important to identify the determinants of 
democratization.  The results of this paper suggest that the beliefs about the effectiveness of 
democracy as system of governance are shaped by personal joblessness experience of the 
individuals.  This in turn implies that periods of high unemployment and joblessness could 
hinder the development of democracy, or threaten its existence.  24 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics and Descriptions 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Democracy is Bad for the 
Economy 
=1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees 
that in democracies the economic system runs 




=1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees 
that democracies are indecisive and have too 
much squabbling and zero otherwise. (A) 
0.513 0.500 
Rogue Leader  =1 if the individual believes that a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with 
parliament and elections is good or very good 
for governing the country. (A) 
0.353 0.478 
Jobless  =1 if the individual is unemployed. (A)  0.088  0.284 
Unemployment Rate 
a Unemployment  Rate  (F)  9.571  6.185 
Democracy is Not Better  =1 if the individual disagrees or strongly 
disagrees to “Democracy may have problems 
but it's better than any other form of 
government” (A). 
0.127 0.333 
Dislikes Democracy in a 
Democratic Country 
=1 if the individual disagrees or strongly 
disagrees to “Democracy may have problems 
but it's better than any other form of 
government” and lives in a democratic country 
(A). 
0.080 0.271 
Likes Democracy in a Less 
Democratic Country 
=1 if the individual agrees or strongly agrees to 
“Democracy may have problems but it's better 
than any other form of government” and lives 
in a less democratic country (A). 
0.242 0.428 
Female  Dummy for females. (A)  0.505  0.500 
Age  Age of the individual. Scaled by 0.1. (A)  4.071  1.602 
Low Income  =1 if the individual’s household income is less 
than the 33
th percentile of the income 
distribution in his/her country. (A) 
0.335 0.472 
Medium Income  =1 if the individual’s household income is 
between 33
th and 67
th percentiles of the income 
distribution in his/her country. (A) 
0.359 0.480 
High Income  =1 if the individual’s household income is 
greater than 67
th percentile of the income 
distribution in his/her country. (A) 
0.306 0.461 
Low Education  =1 if at most the individual either has 
inadequately or fully completed elementary 
education or has not adequately completed 
secondary school. (A) 
0.356 0.479 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
Middle Education  =1 if the individual has completed secondary 
school but not tertiary. (A) 
0.429 0.495 
High Education  =1 if the individual has completed tertiary 
education in full or in part. (A) 
0.215 0.411 
Single  =1 if the individual is single. (A)  0.254  0.435 
Married  =1 if the individual is married or living 
together with a partner. (A) 
0.627 0.484 
Divorced/Widowed  =1 if the individual is separated divorced or 
widowed. (A) 
0.119 0.324 
Full-time  =1 if the individual is working full-time. (A)  0.371  0.483 
Part-time  =1 if the individual is working part-time. (A)  0.075  0.263 
Self-employed  =1 if the individual is self-employed. (A)  0.098  0.297 
Retired  =1 if the individual is retired. (A)  0.136  0.343 
Housewife  =1 if the individual is a housewife. (A)  0.137  0.344 
Student  =1 if the individual is a student. (A)  0.077  0.266 
Other Employed  =1 if employment status of the individual is 
something other than those listed. (A) 
0.018 0.134 
No Children  =1 if the individual has no children. (A)  0.289  0.453 
1 Child  =1 if the individual has 1 child. (A)  0.163  0.370 
2 Children  =1 if the individual has 2 children. (A)  0.266  0.442 
3 Children  =1 if the individual has 3 children. (A)  0.139  0.346 
4+ Children  =1 if the individual has 4 or more children. (A)  0.143  0.350 
Democracy
a  Extent of Democracy in a country obtained 
from the Combined Polity Score of POLITY 
IV. Ranges from -10 (Least democratic) to 10 
(Most democratic). (I) 
6.248 5.226 
Country Ever Colonized 
a  =1 if the country where the individual lives has 
ever been colonized. (B) 
0.385 0.478 
HDI 
a  Human Development Index. A composite 
index that measures the average achievements 
in a country in three basic dimensions life 
expectancy at birth, the adult literacy rate and 
the combined gross enrolment ratio for 
primary, secondary and 
tertiary schools and real GDP per capita (E) 
79.400 12.935 
Openness to Trade 
a  Total trade (exports plus imports) as a 
percentage of GDP in 2000 prices. (G) 
75.697 51.329 
Military Expenditure 
a Military  expenditures  as a % of GDP. (H)  2.223  1.549 
Inflation Rate 
a  Inflation Rate calculated from GDP deflator.  0.245  0.959 
% Muslim Population 
a  Percent of population who are Muslims. (D)  13.685  30.380 
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Table 1 (concluded) 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev. 
% Catholic Population 
a  Percent of population who are Catholics. (D)  37.047  39.246 
% Protestant Population 
a  Percent of population who are Protestants. (D)  13.906  24.968 








a  =1 if the country is located in Europe.  0.529  0.502 
Africa 
a  =1 if the country located in Africa.  0.087  0.283 
Asia 
a  =1 if the country is located in Asia.  0.183  0.388 
South America 
a  =1 if the country is located in South America.  0.135  0.343 
Oceania 
a  =1 if the country is located in Oceania.  0.019  0.138 
North America
 a  =1 if the country is located in North America.  0.048  0.215 
Numbers of non-missing observations for “Democracy is Bad for the Economy”, “Democracies are 
Indecisive” and “A strong Leader can better manage the country” are 118,365, 120,739 and 131,615, 
respectively. For the rest of the variables, the number of non-missing observations range from 115,159 and 
131,540 (except for controls misfit and preferences about democracy for which the numbers of non-missing 
observations is around 110,000).  
Sources of the variables used are presented below. 
(A) World Values Survey. The original sources of the variables used are indicated in parenthesis after the dash.  
(B) Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. 2005. “Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy”, C&M Working Papers 
6, IPSA, August 2005.  
(C) Vanhanen, T. 2003b. Democratization and Power Resources 1850-2000 [computer file]. FSD1216, 
version 1.0 (2003-03-10). Tampere : Finnish Social Science Data Archive [distributor]. 
(D) La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.. and Vishny, R. 1999. The Quality of Government. Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1): 222-279. 
(E) United Nations Development Program (UNDP). http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ 
(F) World Bank’s World Development Indicators, International Labour Organization’s KILM database. If the 
unemployment rate was not available for one country at a specific year, it is imputed by using either the most 
recent year’s unemployment rate or the average of the closest year’s unemployment rate. If neither of the 
imputations work, then the unemployment rate from KILM database is employed. 
(G) Penn World tables 6.2 
(H) World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(I) POLITY IV. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. The data on democracy variable were not 
available for some countries for some years from the source. The democracy variable is completed by 
assigning the closest year’s democracy index value in that country or that of the previous governing country. 
See footnote 6 in the text for details. 








Influence of Joblessness on Perceptions about Performance of Democracy 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 






Jobless 0.049***  0.028***  0.054*** 
  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.011) 
Unemployment Rate  0.004**  0.002  0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Democracy is Not Better  0.224***  0.160***  0.178*** 
  (0.036) (0.030)  (0.018) 
Female 0.024***  0.002  -0.015*** 
  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.005) 
Age -0.006**  -0.000  -0.006** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Medium Income  -0.020***  -0.020***  -0.018*** 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.006) 
High Income  -0.050***  -0.037***  -0.030*** 
  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.010) 
Middle Education  -0.052***  -0.039***  -0.035*** 
  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.010) 
High Education  -0.124***  -0.108***  -0.086*** 
  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.015) 
Married 0.008  0.016*  0.013 
  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Divorced/Widowed 0.026**  0.039***  0.028** 
  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.011) 
Part-time 0.014  0.007  0.014 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.010) 
Self-employed -0.003  0.009  0.008 
  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.011) 
Retired 0.048***  0.053***  0.043*** 
  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009) 
Housewife -0.014  -0.023**  0.029** 
  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.014) 
Student -0.006  0.001  0.005 
  (0.010) (0.013)  (0.010) 
Other Employed  -0.010  -0.018  0.003 
  (0.018) (0.019)  (0.020) 
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Table 2 (concluded) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 






1 Child  0.007  -0.001  0.013 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) 
2 Children  0.014*  0.005  0.009 
  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.010) 
3 Children  0.008  0.002  0.005 
  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.011) 
4+ Children  0.003  -0.020  0.025* 
  (0.012) (0.013)  (0.014) 
HDI -0.001  0.002  -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Openness to Trade  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Military Expenditure  0.017**  0.005  -0.004 
  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.010) 
Inflation Rate  0.013  0.002  0.018 
  (0.014) (0.014)  (0.012) 
Country Ever Colonized  0.169***  0.088  0.093 
  (0.058) (0.065)  (0.076) 
% Muslim  -0.002***  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Catholic  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Protestant  -0.002***  -0.002**  -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations 118,365  120,739  131,615 
Notes – The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or 
strongly agrees to the statements “Democracy is Bad for the Economy,” “Democracies are Indecisive” and “A 
strong leader can better manage the country,” respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are 
presented in Table 1. All regressions include year dummies as well as continent fixed effects. ***, ** and * 






Influence of Joblessness on Perceptions about Performance of Democracy 
Controlling for Political Misfit 
 
Panel A: Models with Country Characteristics 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 





Jobless 0.045***  0.025**  0.049*** 
  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.010) 
Unemployment Rate  0.005***  0.002  0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
















Observations 118,365  120,739  131,615 
      
      
Panel B: Models with Country Fixed Effects 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 





Jobless 0.041***  0.025***  0.033*** 
  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.007) 
Unemployment Rate  -0.000  -0.005*  0.004 
  (0.005) (0.003)  (0.005) 
















Observations 118,365  120,739  131,615 
Notes – The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or 
strongly agrees to the statements “Democracy is Bad for the Economy,” “Democracies are Indecisive” and “A 
strong Leader can better manage the country,” respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are 
presented in Table 1. All regressions include individual level variables, year dummies as well as continent 
fixed effects as in Table 2. The models in Panel A and B include country characteristics and country fixed 
effects, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard 





Influence of Joblessness on Perceptions about Performance of Democracy 
In Less Democratic Countries (Democracy<7) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 





Jobless 0.040***  0.023*  0.004 
  (0.010) (0.013)  (0.013) 
Unemployment Rate  0.007***  0.013***  0.019*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.003) 








Female 0.027***  0.006  -0.001 
  (0.008) (0.011)  (0.010) 
Age 0.006  0.010*  0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) 
Medium Income  -0.022  -0.021*  -0.011 
  (0.015) (0.012)  (0.012) 
High Income  -0.045**  -0.056***  -0.026 
  (0.019) (0.018)  (0.016) 
Middle Education  -0.016  0.002  0.005 
  (0.015) (0.018)  (0.018) 
High Education  -0.070***  -0.043  -0.051* 
  (0.022) (0.028)  (0.027) 
Married 0.018  -0.000  0.001 
  (0.012) (0.018)  (0.015) 
Divorced/Widowed 0.061***  0.040*  0.011 
  (0.017) (0.022)  (0.016) 
Part-time 0.031  0.006  0.011 
  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.024) 
Self-employed 0.024  0.014  -0.001 
  (0.017) (0.016)  (0.014) 
Retired 0.035**  0.040***  0.039* 
  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.021) 
Housewife 0.006  -0.014  0.009 
  (0.017) (0.018)  (0.016) 
Student 0.012  -0.012  0.033** 
  (0.017) (0.012)  (0.015) 
Other Employed  0.010  -0.027  0.012 
  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.024) 
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Table 4A (concluded) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 





1 Child  -0.012  -0.013  -0.000 
  (0.011) (0.016)  (0.015) 
2 Children  0.009  -0.001  0.016 
  (0.014) (0.013)  (0.015) 
3 Children  0.021  0.015  0.014 
  (0.016) (0.018)  (0.022) 
4+ Children  -0.017  -0.029**  0.020 
  (0.015) (0.013)  (0.025) 
HDI -0.004***  0.007  -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004)  (0.003) 
Openness to Trade  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) 
Military Expenditure  0.031**  -0.057*  0.018 
  (0.012) (0.030)  (0.021) 
Inflation Rate  0.014  0.120**  0.116 
  (0.037) (0.058)  (0.095) 
Country Ever Colonized  -0.172***  -0.060  -0.107 
  (0.033) (0.078)  (0.084) 
% Muslim  -0.000  0.002**  -0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Catholic  -0.003***  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.002) 
% Protestant  -0.002***  -0.004***  -0.002* 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations 34,697  35,232  37,365 
Notes – The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or 
strongly agrees to the statements “Democracy is Bad for the Economy,” “Democracies are Indecisive” and “A 
strong Leader can better manage the country,” respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are 
presented in Table 1 and in the text. The sample consists of individuals from countries with a democracy index 
less than 7.All regressions include year dummies as well as continent fixed effects. ***, ** and * indicate 






Influence of Joblessness on Perceptions about Performance of Democracy 
In Democratic Countries (Democracy>=7) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Democracy is Bad 




Jobless 0.052***  0.034***  0.064*** 
  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.011) 
Unemployment Rate  0.001  -0.005  -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) 








Female 0.025***  -0.002  -0.017*** 
  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.005) 
Age -0.009***  -0.004  -0.006* 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
Medium Income  -0.019**  -0.017**  -0.018** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) 
High Income  -0.053***  -0.026**  -0.021* 
  (0.010) (0.013)  (0.011) 
Middle Education  -0.066***  -0.053***  -0.049*** 
  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) 
High Education  -0.154***  -0.146***  -0.119*** 
  (0.015) (0.014)  (0.014) 
Married -0.000  0.008  0.019* 
  (0.011) (0.008)  (0.010) 
Divorced/Widowed 0.007  0.026***  0.047*** 
  (0.014) (0.009)  (0.012) 
Part-time 0.010  0.007  0.011 
  (0.010) (0.009)  (0.010) 
Self-employed 0.002  0.003  -0.003 
  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.009) 
Retired 0.053***  0.059***  0.046*** 
  (0.008) (0.010)  (0.010) 
Housewife 0.000  -0.004  0.036*** 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.012) 
Student -0.016  -0.007  -0.020* 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.011) 
Other Employed  -0.000  0.012  0.031* 
  (0.019) (0.016)  (0.018) 
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Table 4B (concluded) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Democracy is Bad 




1 Child  0.001  0.001  0.004 
  (0.011) (0.007)  (0.011) 
2 Children  0.014  0.012  -0.009 
  (0.010) (0.008)  (0.009) 
3 Children  0.005  0.004  -0.018* 
  (0.012) (0.010)  (0.010) 
4+ Children  0.010  -0.010  -0.010 
  (0.014) (0.010)  (0.012) 
HDI -0.011***  -0.010***  -0.012*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) 
Openness to Trade  -0.000  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Military Expenditure  0.024  0.004  0.023 
  (0.020) (0.022)  (0.020) 
Inflation Rate  0.013  0.011  0.026** 
  (0.014) (0.013)  (0.011) 
Country Ever Colonized  0.009  -0.106  -0.021 
  (0.098) (0.103)  (0.120) 
% Muslim  -0.002***  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Catholic  0.001  0.001*  0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Protestant  -0.000  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
Observations 80,954  82,727  91,341 
Notes – The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual agrees or 
strongly agrees to the statements “Democracy is Bad for the Economy,” “Democracies are Indecisive” and “A 
strong Leader can better manage the country,” respectively. The descriptions of the other variables are 
presented in Table 1 and in the text. The sample consists of individuals from countries with a democracy index 
greater than or equal to 7. All regressions include year dummies as well as continent fixed effects. ***, ** and 






Influence of Joblessness on Satisfaction with and Confidence in the Government 
 
Panel A 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dissatisfied with 




Country is run 
for the Interest 
of the few 
Jobless 0.010  -0.014  -0.019 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.014) 
Unemployment Rate  0.009***  0.003  0.006** 
  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Democracy is Not Better  0.084***  0.079***  0.045*** 
(0.020) (0.019)  (0.016) 
Observations 96,710  95,215  92,590 
Panel B 
(1) (2)  (3) 
Dissatisfied with 




Country is run 
for the Interest 
of the few 
Jobless 0.011  -0.015  -0.019 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.013) 
Unemployment Rate  0.009***  0.003  0.006*** 
  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) 
















Observations 96,710  95,215  92,590 
Notes – The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3, take the value of 1 if the individual indicates 
that he is fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way the people now in national office are handling the 
country's affairs (column 1), if  he/she does not have very much confidence or had no confidence in the 
government (column 2), and if he/she indicates that the country is run by a few big interests rather than the 
interests of all people (column 3). The descriptions of the other variables are presented in Table 1 and in the 
text. All regressions include individual level variables, year dummies as well as continent fixed effects as in 
Table 2. The models in Panel A and B include country characteristics and country fixed effects, respectively. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at 




Influence of Joblessness Duration on Perceptions about Performance of Democracy 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Democracy is Bad 




Jobless: Less than 6 months  0.075  0.101  0.090 
 (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.069) 
Jobless: 6 months  to1 year  0.051  0.015  0.073 
 (0.053)  (0.062)  (0.058) 
Jobless: More than 1 year  0.203***  0.098*  0.221*** 
 (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.060) 
Unemployment Rate  0.053*  0.041  0.011 
 (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Dislikes Democracy in a 
Democratic country 
0.650*** 0.400***  0.513*** 
(0.132) (0.134)  (0.078) 
Likes Democracy in a Less 
Democratic country 
-0.753*** -0.935***  -0.503** 
(0.266) (0.209)  (0.182) 
Female 0.117***  0.013  -0.021 
 (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.023) 
Age -0.008  0.014  0.006 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Medium Income  -0.035  -0.022  -0.057*** 
 (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.022) 
High Income  -0.152***  -0.106***  -0.097*** 
 (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.031) 
Middle Education  -0.243***  -0.187***  -0.167*** 
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.033) 
High Education  -0.540***  -0.406***  -0.371*** 
 (0.049)  (0.044)  (0.049) 
Married -0.064  -0.031  0.016 
 (0.041)  (0.038)  (0.036) 
Divorced/Widowed -0.029  0.029  0.093** 
 (0.055)  (0.042)  (0.044) 
Part-time -0.032  0.049  -0.013 
 (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.048) 
Self-employed -0.108**  -0.081*  -0.130** 
 (0.045)  (0.042)  (0.052) 
Retired 0.111***  0.155***  0.072* 
 (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.039) 
Housewife -0.129**  -0.094*  0.084 
 (0.051)  (0.048)  (0.064) 
      36 
 
      
Table 6 (concluded) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Democracy is Bad 




Student -0.121**  -0.081*  -0.147*** 
 (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.041) 
Other Employed  0.069  -0.026  0.054 
 (0.078)  (0.088)  (0.071) 
1 Child  0.065  0.065**  0.024 
 (0.041)  (0.028)  (0.047) 
2 Children  0.082**  0.050  -0.041 
 (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.041) 
3 Children  0.071  0.051  -0.025 
 (0.046)  (0.049)  (0.053) 
4+ Children  0.130***  -0.008  0.019 
 (0.048)  (0.062)  (0.050) 
HDI -0.008  -0.007  -0.023 
 (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.022) 
Openness to Trade  0.000  0.001  0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Military Expenditure  0.129*  0.077  -0.049 
 (0.069)  (0.092)  (0.084) 
Inflation Rate  0.677*  0.735*  0.305 
 (0.347)  (0.430)  (0.295) 
% Muslim  0.007  0.026  0.040* 
 (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.022) 
% Catholic  -0.000  0.003  -0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
% Protestant  -0.003  0.001  -0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Observations 33,964  35,013  35,791 
Notes – The dependent variables, listed at the top of rows 1 to 3 in each panel, take the value of 1 if the 
individual agrees or strongly agrees to the statements “Democracy is Bad for the Economy,” “Democracies are 
Indecisive” and “A strong leader can better manage the country,” respectively. The descriptions of the other 
variables are presented in Table 1. The sample used includes individuals from countries to which joblessness 
duration question is asked. The countries in the sample are Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and Great 
Britain. All regressions include year dummies. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
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